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Abstract
We investigate the effects of user cooperation on the secrecy of broadcast channels
by considering a cooperative relay broadcast channel. We show that user cooperation
can increase the achievable secrecy region. We propose an achievable scheme that
combines Marton’s coding scheme for broadcast channels and Cover and El Gamal’s
compress-and-forward scheme for relay channels. We derive outer bounds for the rate-
equivocation region using auxiliary random variables for single-letterization. Finally,
we consider a Gaussian channel and show that both users can have positive secrecy
rates, which is not possible for scalar Gaussian broadcast channels without cooperation.
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CCF 04-47613, CCF 05-14846, CNS 07-16311 and CCF 07-
29127, and presented in part at the Information Theory and Applications Workshop, San Diego, CA, January
2008 and the IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, Toronto, Canada, July 2008 [1].
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1 Introduction
The open nature of wireless communications facilitates cooperation by allowing users to ex-
ploit the over-heard information to increase achievable rates. However, the same open nature
of wireless communications makes it vulnerable to security attacks such as eavesdropping
and jamming. In this paper, we investigate the interaction of these two phenomena, namely
cooperation and secrecy. In particular, we investigate the effects of cooperation on secrecy.
The eavesdropping attack was first studied from an information theoretic point of view
by Wyner in [2], where he established the secrecy capacity for a single-user degraded wire-
tap channel. Later, Csiszar and Korner [3] studied the general, not necessarily degraded,
single-user eavesdropping channel, and found the secrecy capacity. More recently multi-user
versions of the secrecy problem have been considered for various channel models. Refer-
ences [4–8] consider multiple access channels (MAC), where in [4, 5] the eavesdropper is an
external entity, while in [6–8] the users in the MAC act as eavesdroppers on each other. Ref-
erences [9, 10] consider broadcast channels (BC) where both receivers want to have secure
communication with the transmitter; in here as well, each receiver of the BC is an eavesdrop-
per for the other user. References [11–16] consider secrecy in relay channels, where in [11–13],
the relay is the eavesdropper, while in [14,15] there is an external eavesdropper. In [16], the
relay helps the transmitter to improve its rate while it receives confidential messages that
should be kept hidden from the main receiver.
In a wireless medium, since all users receive a version of all signals transmitted, they
can cooperate to improve their communication rates. The simplest example of a cooperative
system is the relay channel [17] where the relay helps increase the communication rate of
a single-user channel using its over-heard information. Multi-user versions of cooperative
communication have been studied more recently. In [18], a MAC is considered where both
users over-hear a noisy version of the signal transmitted by the other user, and transmit in
such a way to increase their achievable rates. In [19–21], cooperation is done on the receiver
side, where in a BC, one or both of the receivers transmit cooperative signals to improve the
achievable rates of both users.
Our goal is to study the effects cooperation on the secrecy of multiple users where secrecy
refers to simultaneous individual confidentiality of all users. One of the simplest models to
study this interaction is the cooperative relay broadcast channel (CRBC), where there is a
single transmitter and two receivers, and each receiver would like to keep its message secret
from the other user; see Figures 1 and 2. In this model, in order to incorporate the effects of
cooperation, there is either a single-sided (Figure 1) or double-sided (Figure 2) cooperative
link between the users. For clarity of ideas and simplicity of presentation, for a major part
of this paper, we will assume a CRBC with a single-sided cooperation link from the first
user to the second user. We will investigate the effects of two-sided cooperation in Section 8.
Focusing on the single-sided CRBC, we note that if we remove the cooperation link, our
model reduces to the BC with confidential messages in [9, 10], and if we set the rate of the
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Figure 1: Cooperative relay broadcast channel (CRBC) with single-sided cooperative link.
first user to zero, our model reduces to the relay channel with confidential messages in [11–13],
and if we both set the rate of the first user to zero and remove the cooperation link between
the users, our model reduces to the single-user eavesdropper channel in [2, 3]. Our model is
the simplest model (except perhaps for the “dual” model of cooperating transmitters in a
MAC with per-user secrecy constraints [8]) that allows us to study the effects of cooperation
(or lack there of) of the first user (the transmitting end of the cooperative link) on its own
equivocation rate as well as on the equivocation rate of the other user (receiving end of the
cooperative link).
Our motivation to study this problem can be best explained in a Gaussian example.
Imagine a two-user Gaussian BC. This BC is degraded in one direction, hence both users
cannot have positive secrecy rates simultaneously [2, 9, 10]. This has motivated [10] to use
multiple antennas at the transmitter in order to remove this degradedness in either of the
directions and provide positive secrecy rates to both users simultaneously. We wish to achieve
a similar effect with a single transmitter antenna, by introducing cooperation from one user
to the other. Imagine now a Gaussian CRBC [19, 20] as in Figure 1, where user 1 acts as
a relay for user 2’s message, i.e., that there is a cooperative link from user 1 to user 2. Let
us assume that in the underlying BC, user 1 has a better channel. Without the cooperative
link, user 2 cannot have secure communication with the transmitter. We show that user 1
can transmit cooperative signals and improve the secrecy rate of user 2. Our main idea is
that user 1 can use a compress-and-forward (CAF) based relaying scheme for the message of
user 2, and increase user 2’s rate to a level which is not decodable by user 1. This improves
user 2’s secrecy. Now, let us assume that in the underlying BC, user 1 has the worse channel.
Without cooperation, user 1 cannot have secure communication with the transmitter. We
show that user 1 can transmit a jamming signal in the cooperative channel first to guarantee
a positive secrecy rate for itself assuming it has enough power. This essentially brings the
system to the setting described in the previous case, and now user 1 can send a cooperative
signal to user 2 to help it achieve a positive secrecy rate as well.
In this paper, we propose an achievable scheme that combines Marton’s coding scheme for
BCs [22] and Cover and El Gamal’s CAF scheme for relay channels [17]. A similar achievable
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Figure 2: Cooperative relay broadcast channel (CRBC) with a two-sided cooperation link.
scheme has appeared in [23] which does not consider any secrecy constraints, hence ours can
be viewed as a generalization of [23] to a secrecy context. A similar achievable scheme also
appeared in [11,13], where CAF is applied to a relay channel to provide improved secrecy for
the main transmitter. A relay channel can be considered as a special case of the single-sided
CRBC where the rate of the first user is set to zero.
In this paper, we also develop a single-letter outer bound on the rate-equivocation region;
we accomplish singe-letterization by using tools proposed in [3], namely by determining
suitable auxiliary random variables. Besides this outer bound, for the second user, that is
being helped in the single-sided CRBC, we develop another single-letter outer bound which
depends only on the channel inputs and outputs.
To visualize the effects of cooperation on secrecy, we consider a Gaussian CRBC and show
that both users can have positive secrecy rates through user cooperation. To obtain positive
secrecy rates for both users, we provide different assignments for the auxiliary random vari-
ables appearing in the achievable rates. These auxiliary random variable assignments have
dirty paper coding (DPC) interpretations [24]. In addition, we combine jamming and relay-
ing to provide secrecy for both users when the relaying user is weak. Finally, we consider the
CRBC with a two-sided cooperation link and provide an achievable scheme for this channel.
2 The Channel Model and Definitions
From here until the beginning of Section 8, we will focus on a single-sided CRBC, and refer
to it simply as CRBC. The CRBC can be viewed as a relay channel where the transmitter
sends messages both to the relay node and the destination. Therefore, one of the users, user
1 in our case, in a CRBC both decodes its own message and also helps the other user. A
CRBC consists of two message sets w1 ∈ W1, w2 ∈ W2, two input alphabets, one at the
transmitter x ∈ X and one at user 1 x1 ∈ X1, and two output alphabets y1 ∈ Y1, y2 ∈ Y2,
where the former is for user 1 and the latter is for user 2. The channel is assumed to be
memoryless and its transition probability distribution is p(y1, y2|x, x1).
A
(
2nR1, 2nR2, n
)
code for this channel consists of two message sets asW1 =
{
1, . . . , 2nR1
}
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and W2 =
{
1, . . . , 2nR2
}
, an encoder at the transmitter with mapping W1 ×W2 → X n, a
set of relay functions at user 1, x1,i = fi(y1,1, . . . , y1,i−1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, two decoders,
one at each user with the mappings g1 : Yn1 → W1 and g2 : Y
n
2 → W2. The proba-
bility of error is defined as P ne = max
{
P ne,1, P
n
e,2
}
where P ne,1 = Pr (g1(Y
n
1 ) 6= W1) , P
n
e,2 =
Pr (g2(Y
n
2 ) 6= W2). The secrecy of the users is measured by the equivocation rates which are
1
n
H(W1|Y n2 ) and
1
n
H(W2|Y n1 , X
n
1 ). Since user 1 has its own channel input, we condition the
entropy rate of user 2’s messages on this channel input.
A rate tuple (R1, R2, Re,1, Re,2) is said to be achievable if there exists a
(
2nR1, 2nR2, n
)
code with limn→∞ P
n
e = 0 and
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W1|Y
n
2 ) ≥ Re,1, lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W2|Y
n
1 , X
n
1 ) ≥ Re,2 (1)
3 An Achievable Scheme
We now provide an achievable scheme which combines Marton’s coding scheme for BCs [22]
and Cover and El Gamal’s CAF scheme for relay channels [17]. A similar achievable scheme
has appeared in [23] without any secrecy considerations. In this scheme, user 1 sends a
quantized version of its observation to user 2, which uses this information to decode its own
message. The corresponding achievable rate-equivocation region is given by the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 The rate tuples (R1, R2, Re,1, Re,2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|X1) (2)
R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|X1) (3)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|X1) + I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|X1)− I(V1;V2) (4)
Re,1 ≤ R1 (5)
Re,1 ≤
[
I(V1; Y1|X1)− I(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|V2, X1)− I(V1;V2)
]+
(6)
Re,2 ≤ R2 (7)
Re,2 ≤
[
I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|X1)− I(V2; Y1|V1, X1)− I(V1;V2)
]+
(8)
are achievable for any distribution of the form
p(v1, v2)p(x|v1, v2)p(x1)p(yˆ1|x1, v1, y1)p(y1, y2|x, x1) (9)
subject to the constraint
I(Yˆ1; Y1|X1, V1) ≤ I(Yˆ1, X1; Y2) (10)
This theorem is a special case of Theorem 4 and obtained from the latter by setting U = X1.
Therefore, we will omit the proof of Theorem 1 here and will provide the proof of Theorem 4
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in Appendix D. In (6) and (8), (x)+ is the positivity operator, i.e., (x)+ = max(0, x).
Remark 1 We note that both the form of the probability distribution in (9) and the con-
straint in (10) in Theorem 1 are somewhat different than those of the classical CAF scheme
in [17]. First, we condition the distribution of Yˆ1 on V1 to prevent the compressed version of
Y1 to leak any additional information regarding user 1’s message on top of what user 2 already
has through its own observation. The constraint in (10) also reflects this concern. Similar
constraints on the distribution of Yˆ1 and on the compression rate have appeared in [23],
where these modifications are not due to secrecy constraints contrary to here. In [23], these
are imposed to obtain higher rates for user 2 by removing user 1’s private message from the
compressed signal, whereas here, they are imposed not to let Yˆ1 leak any additional informa-
tion regarding user 1’s message. Moreover, if we let user 1 compress its observation without
erasing its own message from the observation, i.e., if we change the conditional distribution
of Yˆ1 to p(yˆ1|x1, y1), we can recover the constraint in [17] (see equations (29)-(31) in [23]).
Remark 2 If we disable the assistance of user 1 to user 2 by setting X1 = Yˆ1 = φ, the
channel model reduces to the BC with secrecy constraints, and the achievable equivocation
region becomes
RBCe,1 ≤ I(V1; Y1)− I(V1; Y2|V2)− I(V1;V2) (11)
RBCe,2 ≤ I(V2; Y2)− I(V2; Y1|V1)− I(V1;V2) (12)
where we require the Markov chain (V1, V2)→ X → (Y1, Y2). This result was derived in [10].
Remark 3 If we disable both cooperation between receivers by setting X1 = Yˆ1 = φ, and
also the confidential messages sent to user 1 by setting V1 = φ, the channel model reduces
to the single-user eavesdropper channel, and the achievable equivocation rate for the second
user becomes
Re,2 ≤ I(V2; Y2)− I(V2; Y1) (13)
and the Markov chain V2 → X → (Y1, Y2) is required by the probability distribution in (9).
This is exactly the secrecy capacity of the single-user eavesdropper channel given in [3].
Remark 4 If we disable the confidential messages sent to user 1 by setting V1 = φ, the
channel model reduces to a relay channel with secrecy constraints, and the achievable equiv-
ocation rate for the second user becomes
Re,2 ≤ I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|X1)− I(V2; Y1|X1) (14)
subject to
I(Yˆ1; Y1|X1) ≤ I(Yˆ1, X1; Y2) (15)
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and the corresponding joint distribution reduces to p(v2, x)p(x1)p(yˆ1|x1, y1)p(y1, y2|x, x1).
Further, if we make the potentially suboptimal selection of V2 = X , the corresponding
achievable secrecy rate and the constraint coincide with their counterparts found in [11] for
the relay channel.
Remark 5 By comparing the equivocation rates of the users in (6) and (8) and the equiv-
ocation rates of the users in the corresponding BC given in (11) and (12), we observe that
the equivocation rate of user 1 may decrease depending on the information contained in Yˆ1
and the equivocation rate of user 2 may increase depending on the channel conditions.
Remark 6 We will show in the next section, where we develop outer bounds for the rate-
equivocation region, that if the channel of user 2 is degraded with respect to the channel
of user 1 then Re,2 = 0 (see Remark 8), where degradedness is defined through the Markov
chain X → (X1, Y1)→ Y2. Here, we show, as an interesting evaluation, that this achievable
scheme cannot yield any positive secrecy rates in this case, as expected.
I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|X1)− I(V2; Y1|V1, X1)− I(V1;V2)
≤ I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1, V1|X1)− I(V2; Y1|V1, X1)− I(V1;V2) (16)
= I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|V1, X1) + I(V2;V1|X1)− I(V2; Y1|V1, X1)− I(V1;V2) (17)
= I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|V1, X1)− I(V2; Y1|V1, X1) (18)
≤ I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1, Y1|V1, X1)− I(V2; Y1|V1, X1) (19)
= I(V2; Y2, Y1|V1, X1) + I(V2; Yˆ1|V1, X1, Y1, Y2)− I(V2; Y1|V1, X1) (20)
= I(V2; Y2, Y1|V1, X1)− I(V2; Y1|V1, X1) (21)
= I(V2; Y2|V1, X1, Y1) (22)
= 0 (23)
where in (18), we used the fact that X1 and (V1, V2) are independent, i.e., I(V1;V2|X1) =
I(V1;V2), in (21), we used the Markov chain (V2, Y2) → (V1, X1, Y1) → Yˆ1 which implies
I(V2; Yˆ1|V1, X1, Y1, Y2) = 0, and in (23), we used the Markov chain (V1, V2) → X →
(X1, Y1)→ Y2 which is due to the assumed degradedness.
4 An Outer Bound
We now provide an outer bound for the rate-equivocation region. Our first outer bound in
Theorem 2 uses auxiliary random variables. Next, in Theorem 3, we provide a simpler outer
bound for user 2 using only the channel inputs and outputs, without employing any auxiliary
random variables.
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Theorem 2 The rate-equivocation region of the CRBC lies in the union of the following
rate tuples1
R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|X1) (24)
R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2) (25)
Re,1 ≤ min
{
R˜e,1, R¯e,1, R1
}
(26)
Re,2 ≤ min
{
R˜e,2, R¯e,2, R2
}
(27)
where
R˜e,1 = I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1; Y2|U) (28)
R˜e,2 = I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2; Y1|U) (29)
R¯e,1 = I(V1; Y1|V2)− I(V1; Y2|V2) (30)
R¯e,2 = I(V2; Y2|V1)− I(V2; Y1|V1) (31)
where the union is taken over all joint distributions satisfying the Markov chain
U → (V1, V2)→ (X,X1, Y1)→ Y2 (32)
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A.
Remark 7 The bounds on the equivocation rates in Theorem 2 and those in [10], where
the outer bounds are for the equivocation rates in a two-user BC with per-user secrecy
constraints as in here, have the same expressions. The only difference between the two outer
bounds is in the Markov chain over which the union is taken. The Markov chain in (32)
contains the one in [10], which is
U → (V1, V2)→ X → (Y1, Y2) (33)
which means that our outer bound here evaluates to a larger region than the one in [10].
This should be expected since the achievable rate-equivocation region here in our CRBC
contains the achievable region in the BC.
We also provide a simpler outer bound for the equivocation rate of user 2 which does not
involve any auxiliary random variables.
Theorem 3 The equivocation rate of user 2 is bounded as follows
Re,2 ≤ max
p(x,x1)
I(X ; Y2|X1, Y1) (34)
1Unfortunately, in the conference version [1] of this paper, the outer bound appeared with some typos.
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The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix B.
Remark 8 If the channel is degraded, then the equivocation rate of user 2 is zero, since
I(X ; Y2|X1, Y1) = 0 (35)
which follows from the Markov chain X → (X1, Y1) → Y2 which is a consequence of the
degradedness.
Remark 9 We generally expect the outer bound in Theorem 3 to be loose because it essen-
tially assumes that user 2 has a complete access to user 1’s observation2 whereas, in reality,
user 2 has only limited information about user 1’s observation, which it obtains through
the cooperative link. However, if the link from user 1 to user 2 is strong enough, user 1
may be able to convey its observation to user 2 precisely in which case the outer bound in
Theorem 3 can be close to the achievable rate obtained via the CAF scheme. For example,
such a situation arises if the channel satisfies the following Markov chain
X → (X1, Y2)→ Y1 (36)
For such channels, by selecting V2 = X, V1 = Yˆ1 = φ in the achievable scheme, we get the
following equivocation rate for user 2
I(X ; Y2|X1)− I(X ; Y1|X1) = I(X ; Y2, Y1|X1)− I(X ; Y1|X1) = I(X ; Y2|X1, Y1) (37)
where the first equality is due to the Markov chain in (36). Hence, the outer bound in (34)
gives the secrecy capacity for channels satisfying (36).
Remark 10 Although we are able to provide a simple outer bound for the equivocation
rate of user 2, that depends only on the channel inputs and outputs, finding such a simple
outer bound for the equivocation rate of user 1 does not seem to be possible. One reason
for this is that, user 1 can use its observation, i.e., Y1, for encoding its input, i.e., X1,
and create correlation between its channel inputs and outputs across time. Consequently,
this correlation cannot be accounted for without using auxiliary random variables. Another
reason will be discussed in Remark 13.
2In fact, this Sato-type [25] upper-bounding technique is used as a first step (before introducing noise
correlation to tighten the upper bound) in finding the secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel [26–29].
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5 An Example: Gaussian CRBC
We now provide an example to show how the proposed achievable scheme can enlarge the
secrecy region for a Gaussian BC. The channel outputs of a Gaussian CRBC are
Y1 = X + Z1 (38)
Y2 = X +X1 + Z2 (39)
where Z1 ∼ N (0, N1), Z2 ∼ N (0, N2) and are independent, E [X2] ≤ P,E [X21 ] ≤ aP . In this
section, we assume that N2 > N1, i.e., user 1 has a stronger channel in the corresponding BC.
Note that, in this case, if user 1 does not help user 2, e.g., in the corresponding BC, Re,2 = 0.
We present two different achievable schemes for this channel where each one corresponds
to a particular selection of the underlying random variables in Theorem 1 satisfying the
probability distribution condition in (9). Proposition 1 assigns independent channel inputs
for each user, whereas Proposition 2 uses a DPC scheme. For simplicity, we provide only the
achievable equivocation region in the following propositions.
Proposition 1 The following equivocation rates are achievable for all α ∈ [0, 1]
Re,1 ≤
1
2
log
(
1 +
αP
α¯P +N1
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
αP
N2
)
(40)
Re,2 ≤
1
2
log
(
1 + α¯P
(
1
αP +N2
+
1
N1 +Nc
))
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
α¯P
N1
)
(41)
where α¯ = 1− α and Nc is subject to
Nc ≥
N2(α¯P +N1) + P (αα¯P +N1)
aP
(42)
Proof: This achievable region can be obtained by selecting V1 ∼ N (0, αP ), V2 ∼ N (0, α¯P ),
X = V1 + V2, X1 ∼ N (0, aP ), Yˆ1 = Y1 − V1 + Zc = V2 + Z1 + Zc and Zc ∼ N (0, Nc),
where V1, V2, X1 and Zc are independent. The rates are found by direct calculation of the
expressions in Theorem 1 using the above selection of random variables. 
This achievable region can be enlarged by introducing correlation between V1, V2. Since
a joint encoding is performed at the transmitter, one of the users’ signals can be treated as
a non-causally known interference, and DPC [24] can be used. In the following proposition,
the transmitter treats user 2’s signal as a non-causally known interference.
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Proposition 2 The following equivocation rates are achievable for any γ and all α ∈ [0, 1]
Re,1 ≤
1
2
log
(
1 +
(α¯γ + α)2P
(α + γ2α¯)N1 + (γ − 1)2αα¯P
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
αP
N2
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 + γ2
α¯
α
)
(43)
Re,2 ≤
1
2
log
(
1 +
α¯P (N1 +Nc) + α¯(1− γ)2P (αP +N2)
(αP +N2)(N1 +Nc)
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
αα¯(γ − 1)2P
(α + γ2α¯)N1
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 + γ2
α¯
α
)
(44)
where α¯ = 1− α and Nc is subject to
Nc ≥
−η +
√
η2 + 4θω
2θ
(45)
where
θ = a(α + α¯γ2)P (46)
η =
(
α + γ2α¯
)
P
[
aN1 + (1− γ)
2α¯P (a+ α¯)
]
− (P +N2)
[
N1(α + γ
2α¯) + αα¯(γ − 1)2P
]
(47)
ω =
{
(P +N2)
[
(1− γ)2α¯P +N1
]
− (1− γ)2α¯2P 2
}{
N1
(
α + γ2α¯
)
+ Pαα¯(γ − 1)2
}
(48)
Proof: These equivocation rates are obtained by applying DPC for user 1. Let the channel
input of the transmitter be X = U1 + U2 where U1 ∼ N (0, αP ), U2 ∼ N (0, α¯P ) and are
independent. The auxiliary random variables are selected as V2 = U2, V1 = U1 + γU2, where
for user 1, the signal of user 2 is treated as non-casually known interference at the transmitter.
The channel output of user 1 is compressed as Yˆ1 = Y1 − V1 + Zc = (1 − γ)U2 + Z1 + Zc
where Zc ∼ N (0, Nc) is the compression noise. The channel input of user 1 is selected as
X1 ∼ N (0, aP ). Here, again, U1, U2, Zc and X1 are all independent. The rates are then
found by direct calculation of the expressions in Theorem 1 using the above selection of
random variables. 
We note that, in both of the propositions above, Re,2 is a monotonically decreasing
function of Nc. Consequently, achievable Re,2 depends on the quality of the cooperative
link between the users. If this link gets better allowing user 1 to convey its observation
in a finer form, user 2’s secrecy increases. For illustrative purposes, the rate regions given
by Propositions 1 and 2 are evaluated for the parameters P = 8, N1 = 1, N2 = 2, and the
corresponding plots are given in Figures 3 and 4. Note that since N2 > N1, if there was no
cooperation between the users, user 2 could not have a positive secrecy rate. We observe
from these figures that, thanks to the cooperation of the users, both users enjoy positive
secrecy rates. However, we observe that a positive secrecy for user 2 comes at the expense
of a decrease in the secrecy of user 1.
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Figure 3: Achievable equivocation rate region for single-sided CRBC using Proposition 1
where V1 and V2 are independent. P = 8, N1 = 1, N2 = 2, i.e, user 2 has no secrecy rate in
the underlying BC.
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Figure 4: Achievable equivocation region for single-sided CRBC using Proposition 2 where
V1, V2 are correlated, admitting a DPC interpretation. P = 8, N1 = 1, N2 = 2, i.e., user 2
has no secrecy rate in the underlying BC.
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In particular, for both propositions, maximum secrecy rate for user 2 is achieved when
user 1 does not have any message itself and acts as a pure relay for user 2. Similarly, user 1
achieves the maximum secrecy rate when user 2 does not have any message. Furthermore, we
note that, for both achievable schemes, as a→∞, the equivocation rate of user 2 approaches
a limit. This is due to the fact that, as a→∞, the achievable equivocation rates are limited
by the link between the transmitter and user 1. Moreover, as a → ∞, user 1 can send its
observation to user 2 perfectly. Thus, in this case, user 2 can be assumed to have a channel
output of (Y1, Y2), which makes the channel of user 1 degraded with respect to the channel
of user 2. Consequently, following the analysis carried out in Remark 9, we expect the outer
bound in Theorem 3 to become tight as a→∞, which is stated in the next corollary.
Corollary 1 As a→∞, the maximum achievable equivocation rate for user 2 becomes
Re,2 =
1
2
log
(
1 + P
(
1
N1
+
1
N2
))
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
N1
)
(49)
The proof of this corollary is given in Appendix C.
6 Joint Jamming and Relaying
The proposed achievability scheme and its application to Gaussian CRBC show us that
user cooperation can enlarge the secrecy region. However, this achievability scheme and
the Gaussian example provide us with only a limited picture of what can be achieved. In
particular, the achievability scheme proposed in Section 3 is designed with the cooperating
user (user 1) being the stronger of the two users in mind. Next, we want to explore what
can be done when the cooperating user (user 1) is the weaker of the two users. In this
case, without the cooperative link, user 1 cannot have a positive secrecy rate. Therefore,
the first question to ask is, whether user 1 can have a positive secrecy rate by utilizing the
cooperative link. The answer to this question is positive if user 1 uses the cooperative link to
send a jamming signal to user 2. However, a more interesting question is whether both users
can achieve positive secrecy simultaneously. The following theorem provides an achievable
scheme, where user 1 performs a combination of jamming and relaying, to provide both users
with positive secrecy rates.
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Theorem 4 The rate quadruples (R1, R2, Re,1, Re,2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|X1) (50)
R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|U) (51)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|X1) + I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|U)− I(V1;V2) (52)
Re,1 ≤ R1 (53)
Re,1 ≤
[
I(V1; Y1|X1)− I(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|V2, U)− I(V1;V2)
]+
(54)
Re,2 ≤ R2 (55)
Re,2 ≤
[
I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|U)− I(V2; Y1|V1, X1)− I(V1;V2)
]+
(56)
are achievable for any distribution of the form
p(v1, v2)p(x|v1, v2)p(u)p(x1|u)p(yˆ1|u, v1, y1)p(y1, y2|x, x1) (57)
subject to the following constraint
I(Yˆ1; Y1|X1, V1, U) ≤ I(Yˆ1, U ; Y2) (58)
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix D.
Remark 11 In Theorem 4, U denotes the actual help signal, while the channel input X1,
which is correlated with U , may include an additional jamming attack. The intuition behind
this achievable scheme is that, although user 2 should be able to decode U , it cannot decode
the entire X1. Therefore, since user 2 cannot decode and eliminate X1 from Y2, its channel
becomes an attacked one, where decoding V1 may be impossible. Therefore, in this scheme,
user 1 first attacks user 2 to make its channel worse by associating U with many X1s (hence,
it confuses user 2), and then helps it to improve its secrecy rate.
Remark 12 We note that this achievable scheme is reminiscent of “cooperative jamming”
[30]. In [30], the focus is on a two user MAC with an external eavesdropper, where one of the
users attacks both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, with the hope that it hurts
the eavesdropper more than it hurts the legitimate receiver, and improves the secrecy of the
legitimate receiver. In contrast, in our work, the relay (user 1) attacks user 2 to improve its
own secrecy.
7 Gaussian Example Revisited
Consider again the Gaussian CRBC, now with N1 > N2. The scheme proposed in Theorem 4
works as follows: user 1 divides X1 into two parts. The first part carries the noise and the
second part carries the bin index of Yˆ1. Although Theorem 4 is valid for all cases, assume here
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that user 1 has large enough power. Then, the first part makes user 2’s channel noisier than
user 1’s channel. This brings the situation to the case studied in Section 5. Consequently,
we can now have a positive secrecy rate for user 1, and also provide a positive secrecy rate
to user 2, by sending a compressed version of Y1 to it, as in Section 5.
Proposition 3 The following equivocation rates are achievable for all (α, β) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]
Re,1 ≤
1
2
log
(
1 +
αP
α¯P +N1
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
αP
aβ¯P +N2
)
(59)
Re,2 ≤
1
2
log
(
1 + α¯P
(
1
N1 +Nc
+
1
αP +N2 + aβ¯P
))
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
α¯P
N1
)
(60)
where α¯ = 1− α, β¯ = 1− β, and Nc is subject to
Nc ≥
α¯P (αP +N2 + aβ¯P ) +N1(P +N2 + aβ¯P )
aβP
(61)
Proof: This achievable region is obtained by selecting the random variables in Theorem 4 as
X = V1+V2 where V1 ∼ N (0, αP ), V2 ∼ N (0, α¯P ), X1 = U+Zj where U ∼ N (0, aβP ), Zj ∼
N (0, aβ¯P ), Yˆ1 = Y1−V1+Zc = V2+Z1+Zc where Zc ∼ N (0, Nc). Moreover, V1, V2, U, Zj, Zc
are all independent. Here, Zj serves as the jamming signal, and U serves as the helper signal.
User 1 first jams user 2 and makes its channel noisier than its own by using Zj and then helps
user 2 through sending a compressed version of its observation by using U . The rates are
then found by direct calculation of the expressions in Theorem 4 using the above selection
of random variables. 
Moreover, as in Section 5, we can use DPC based schemes in this case also. The following
proposition characterizes the DPC scheme for Theorem 4.
Proposition 4 The following equivocation rates are achievable for any γ and for all (α, β) ∈
[0, 1]× [0, 1]
Re,1 ≤
1
2
log
(
1 +
(α¯γ + α)2P
(α + γ2α¯)N1 + (γ − 1)2αα¯P
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
αP
(aβ¯P +N2)
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 + γ2
α¯
α
)
(62)
Re,2 ≤
1
2
log
(
1 +
α¯P (N1 +Nc) + α¯(1− γ)2P (αP + aβ¯P +N2)
(αP + aβ¯P +N2)(N1 +Nc)
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
αα¯(γ − 1)2P
(α+ γ2α¯)N1
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 + γ2
α¯
α
)
(63)
where α¯ = 1− α, β¯ = 1− β and Nc is subject to
Nc ≥
−η +
√
η2 + 4θω
2θ
(64)
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where
θ = aβ(α + α¯γ2)P (65)
η =
(
α + γ2α¯
)
P
[
aβN1 + (1− γ)
2α¯P (aβ + α¯)
]
− (P + aβ¯P +N2)
[
N1(α+ γ
2α¯) + αα¯(γ − 1)2P
]
(66)
ω =
[
(P + aβ¯ +N2)
[
(1− γ)2α¯P +N1
]
− (1− γ)2α¯2P 2
] [
N1
(
α + γ2α¯
)
+ Pαα¯(γ − 1)2
]
(67)
Proof: All random variable selections are the same as in Proposition 2 except for X1, U .
Here, we choose X1 = Zj + U and U ∼ N (0, aβP ), Zj ∼ N (0, aβ¯P ). U,Zj are independent.

We first note that Propositions 3, 4 reduce to Propositions 1, 2, respectively, by simply
selecting β = 0, i.e., no jamming. We provide a numerical example in Figures 5, 6 for
P = 8, N1 = 2, N2 = 1. Since N1 > N2, a positive secrecy rate for user 1 would not be
possible if the cooperative link did not exist. However, if user 1 has enough power to make
user 2’s channel noisier by injecting Gaussian noise to it, user 1 can provide secrecy for itself.
For user 1 to have positive secrecy, we need
a ≥
N1 −N2
P
(68)
Otherwise, user 1 cannot have positive secrecy by using strategies employed in Propositions 3,
4. In addition, contrary to Section 5, we observe from Figures 5 and 6 that here DPC
based schemes do not provide any gain with respect to the independent selection of V1, V2.
Furthermore, we also apply Propositions 3 and 4 to the case where user 1 is stronger than user
2 by selecting the noise variances as N1 = 1, N2 = 2 as in Section 5 to show that propositions
presented in this section cover the ones in Section 5. We provide the corresponding graphs
in Figures 7 and 8. Comparing Figures 3 (resp. 4) and 7 (resp. 8), we observe that even
though the maximum secrecy rate of user 2 remains the same, the maximum secrecy rate of
user 1 is improved significantly. This improvement comes, because through Propositions 3
and 4, user 1 jams the receiver of user 2.
Next, we examine Figures 3 and 7 in more detail. In Figure 3, for instance when a = 100,
the largest Re,2, which is about 0.25 bits/channel use, is obtained when Re,1 = 0. This
corresponds to the case where user 1’s rate and secrecy rate are set to zero. In this case, user
1 serves as a pure relay for user 2. The secrecy rate we obtain at this extreme is the same
as [11, 13]. At the other extreme, the largest Re,1, which is about 0.42 bits/channel use, is
obtained when Re,2 = 0. In this case, user 2 is just an eavesdropper in a single-user channel
from the transmitter to user 1. The secrecy rate we obtain at this extreme is the same
as [2,3,31]. Moreover, as we see from Figure 3, whenever user 1 helps user 2 to have positive
secrecy, it needs to deviate from this extreme point. Thus, user 2’s positive secrecy rates
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Figure 5: Achievable equivocation rate region using Proposition 3 where user 1 jams and
relays, and V1, V2 are independent. P = 8, N1 = 2, N2 = 1, i.e., user 1 cannot have any
positive secrecy in the underlying BC.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
R
e,1 (bits/channel use)
R
e,2           
(bits/channel use)
a = 5
a = 10
a = 50
a = 100
Figure 6: Achievable equivocation rate region using Proposition 4 where user 1 jams and
relays, and V1, V2 are correlated, admitting a DPC interpretation. P = 8, N1 = 2, N2 = 1,
i.e., user 1 cannot have any positive secrecy in the underlying BC.
17
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
R
e,1 (bits/channel use)
R
e,2           
(bits/channel use)
a = 5
a = 10
a = 50
a = 100
Figure 7: Achievable equivocation rate region using Proposition 3 where user 1 jams and
relays, and V1, V2 are independent. P = 8, N1 = 1, N2 = 2, i.e., user 1’s channel is stronger
than user 2.
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Figure 8: Achievable equivocation rate region using Proposition 4 where user 1 jams and
relays, and V1, V2 are correlated, admitting a DPC interpretation. P = 8, N1 = 1, N2 = 2,
i.e., user 1’s channel is stronger than user 2.
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come at the expense of a decrease in user 1’s secrecy rate. If we consider Figure 7, the largest
Re,2 is the same as that in Figure 3, which is again achieved when Re,1 = 0, i.e., when user 1
acts as a pure relay for user 2. However, in Figure 7, user 1’s maximum secrecy rate increases
dramatically due to its jamming capabilities in Proposition 3. In Figure 7, user 1 achieves its
maximum secrecy rate, which is about 1.58 bits/channel use, when it uses all of its power for
jamming user 2’s receiver and when the rate of user 2 is set to zero. We note that this rate
is larger than that is achievable in the corresponding single-user eavesdropper channel from
the transmitter to user 1, while user 2 is an eavesdropper. We observe from Figure 7 that
when user 1 is able to jam and relay jointly, it can provide secrecy for user 2 while its own
secrecy rate is still larger than that of the corresponding single-user eavesdropper channel.
Thus, as opposed to the case where it can only relay, i.e., Proposition 1, both users enjoy
secrecy in Proposition 3, while user 1 does not have to compromise from its own secrecy rate
that is achievable in the underlying eavesdropper channel.
Remark 13 We are now ready to discuss why we could not find an outer bound for the
equivocation rate of user 1 that relies only on the channel inputs and outputs. To understand
this, we first examine the outer bound we found on the equivocation rate of user 2 in
Theorem 3. This outer bound is obtained by giving the entire observation of user 1 to user
2 (i.e., Nc = 0). Hence, this is the best possible scenario as far as the channel of user 2 is
concerned, and thus, it yields an outer bound. However, a similar approach cannot work
for user 1, because although user 1 can have access to the observation of user 2, user 1
still has additional freedom (and opportunities) to increase its own secrecy rate by sending
jamming signals over the cooperative link, as shown in this section. This is the main reason
why we could not find a simple outer bound for user 1’s secrecy rate using only the channel
inputs/outputs.
8 Two-sided Cooperation
In this section, we provide an achievable scheme for CRBC with two-sided cooperation. In
this case, each user can act as a relay for the other one; see Figure 2. The corresponding
channel consists of two message sets w1 ∈ W1, w2 ∈ W2, three input alphabets, one at the
transmitter x ∈ X , one at user 1 x1 ∈ X1 and one at user 2 x2 ∈ X2. The channel consists of
two output alphabets denoted by y1 ∈ Y1, y2 ∈ Y2 at the two users. The channel is assumed
to be memoryless and its transition probability distribution is p(y1, y2|x, x1, x2).
A
(
2nR1, 2nR2 , n
)
code for this channel consists of two message set asW1 =
{
1, . . . , 2nR1
}
and W2 =
{
1, . . . , 2nR2
}
, an encoder at the transmitter which maps each pair (w1, w2) ∈
(W1 ×W2) to a codeword xn ∈ X n, a set of relay functions at user 1, x1,i = f1,i(y1,1, . . . , y1,i−1),
1 ≤ i ≤ n, and a set of relay functions at user 2, x2,i = f2,i(y2,1, . . . , y2,i−1), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, two
decoders, one at user 1 and one at user 2 with the mappings g1 : Yn1 →W1, g2 : Y
n
2 →W2.
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Definitions for the error probability for this two-sided case are the same as in the single-
sided case. The secrecy of the users is again measured by the equivocation rates which are
1
n
H(W1|Y n2 , X
n
2 ) and
1
n
H(W2|Y n1 , X
n
1 ). In this case, since user 2 has a channel input also, we
condition the entropy rate of user 1’s messages on this channel input.
A rate tuple (R1, R2, Re,1, Re,2) is said to be achievable if there exists a
(
2nR1, 2nR2, n
)
code with limn→∞ P
n
e = 0, and
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W1|Y
n
2 , X
n
2 ) ≥ Re,1, lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W2|Y
n
1 , X
n
1 ) ≥ Re,2 (69)
The following theorem characterizes an achievable region for this channel model.
Theorem 5 The rate tuples (R1, R2, Re,1, Re,2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1, Yˆ2|X1, U2) (70)
R2 ≤ I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|X2, U1) (71)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1; Y1, Yˆ2|X1, U2) + I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|X2, U1)− I(V1;V2) (72)
Re,1 ≤ R1 (73)
Re,1 ≤
[
I(V1; Y1, Yˆ2|X1, U2)− I(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|V2, X2, U1)− I(V1;V2)
]+
(74)
Re,2 ≤ R2 (75)
Re,2 ≤
[
I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|X2, U1)− I(V2; Y1, Yˆ2|V1, X1, U2)− I(V1;V2)
]+
(76)
are achievable for any distribution of the form
p(v1, v2)p(x|v1, v2)p(u1, x1)p(yˆ1|u1, y1)p(u2, x2)p(yˆ2|u2, y2)p(y1, y2|x, x1, x2) (77)
subject to the following constraints
I(Yˆ1; Y1|U1, X1, U2) ≤ I(Yˆ1, U1; Y2|X2) (78)
I(Yˆ2; Y2|U2, X2, U1) ≤ I(Yˆ2, U2; Y1|X1) (79)
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix E.
Contrary to the previous achievable schemes given in Theorem 1 and 4, here users do not
compress their observations after erasing their codewords from the observations; this is why
we did not condition Yˆ1 (resp. Yˆ2) on V1 (resp. V2) in (77). In fact, they cannot remove their
own codewords from their observations because each user employs a sliding-window type
decoding scheme, i.e., they should wait until the next block to decode their own codewords,
whereas compression should be performed right after the reception of the previous block,
at which time they have not yet decoded their own messages. However, we note that this
achievable scheme also provides opportunities for jamming as did the achievable scheme
provided in Section 6.
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9 Gaussian Example for Two-sided Cooperation
The channel outputs of a Gaussian CRBC with two-sided cooperation are
Y1 = X +X2 + Z1 (80)
Y2 = X +X1 + Z2 (81)
where Z1 ∼ N (0, N1), Z2 ∼ N (0, N2) and are independent, E [X2] ≤ P , E [X21 ] ≤ a1P ,
E [X22 ] ≤ a2P .
We present the following proposition which characterizes an achievable equivocation re-
gion.
Proposition 5 The following equivocation rates are achievable for all (α, β1, β2) ∈ [0, 1]3
Re,1 ≤
1
2
log
(
1 +
αP (N1 + a2β¯2P +N2 +Nc,2)
α¯P (N1 + a2β¯2P +N2 +Nc,2) + (N1 + a2β¯2P )(N2 +Nc,2)
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 + αP
(
1
a1β¯1P +N2
+
1
N1 +Nc,1
))
(82)
Re,2 ≤
1
2
log
(
1 +
α¯P (N2 + a1β¯1P +N2 +Nc,1)
αP (N2 + a1β¯1P +N1 +Nc,1) + (N2 + a1β¯1P )(N1 +Nc,1)
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 + αP
(
1
a2β¯2P +N1
+
1
N2 +Nc,2
))
(83)
where α¯ = 1− α, β¯1 = 1− β1, β¯2 = 1− β2, and Nc,1, Nc,2 are subject to
Nc,1 ≥
−b11 +
√
b211 + 4a11c11
2a11
(84)
Nc,2 ≥
−b22 +
√
b222 + 4a22c22
2a22
(85)
and
a11 = a1β1P (86)
b11 = P
(
P + a1β1(P +N1)
)
− (P +N1 + a2β¯2P )(P +N2 + a1β¯1P ) (87)
c11 = (P +N1 + a2β¯2P )
(
PN1 + (P +N1)(N2 + a1β¯1P )
)
(88)
a22 = a2β2P (89)
b22 = P
(
P + a2β2(P +N2)
)
− (P +N1 + a2β¯2P )(P +N2 + a1β¯1P ) (90)
c22 = (P +N2 + a1β¯1P )
(
PN2 + (P +N2)(N1 + a2β¯2P )
)
(91)
Proof: This achievable region is obtained by selecting X = V1 + V2 where V1 ∼ N (0, αP ),
V2 ∼ N (0, α¯P ) and are independent, Xi = Ui+Z˜i where Ui ∼ N (0, aiβiP ), Z˜i ∼ N (0, aiβ¯iP ),
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Figure 9: Achievable equivocation rate region using Proposition 5 where each user can jointly
jam and relay. P = 8, N1 = 1, N2 = 2, i.e., user 2 cannot have any positive secrecy in the
underlying BC.
i = 1, 2 and independent, and Yˆi = Yi + Zc,i where Zc,i ∼ N (0, Nc,i), i = 1, 2 and are
independent of all other random variables. Direct calculation of rates in Theorem 5 with
these random variable selections yields the achievable region. 
A numerical example is given in Figure 9 for the case P = 8, N1 = 1, N2 = 2. Comparing
Figure 9 with Figures 7 and 8, we observe that user 2’s secrecy rate improves significantly
because now user 2 can jam user 1 to improve its own secrecy rate. We also observe that user
1’s secrecy rate improves as well, compared to Section 7. The increase in user 1’s secrecy in
this two-sided case is due to the fact that user 2 now acts as a relay for user 1. However,
when user 1 jams user 2 using all of its power, it limits the help that comes from user 2,
hence Theorem 5 provides only a modest secrecy rate increase for user 1 on top of what
Theorem 4 already provides.
10 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the effects of cooperation on secrecy. We showed that user
cooperation can increase secrecy, i.e., even an untrusted party can help. An important point
to observe though is that whether cooperation can improve secrecy or not depends on the
cooperation method employed. For instance, even though a decode-and-forward (DAF) based
cooperation scheme can increase the rate, it cannot improve secrecy, because in this case the
cooperating party, which is also the eavesdropper, needs to decode the message it forwards.
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However, in CAF, we do not require the cooperating party to decode the message. In fact, in
CAF, the cooperating party helps increase the rate of the main transmitter to levels which
it itself cannot decode, hence improving the secrecy of the main transmitter-receiver pair
against itself.
Appendices
A Proof of Theorem 2
Here we prove the outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region of the CRBC given in
Theorem 2 which closely follows the converse given in [3] and the outer bound in [10]. First,
define the following random variables
Ui = Y
i−1
1 Y
n
2,i+1 (92)
V1,i = W1Ui (93)
V2,i = W2Ui (94)
which satisfy the following Markov chain
Ui → (V1,i, V2,i)→ (Xi, X1,i, Y1,i)→ Y2,i (95)
but do not satisfy the following one
Ui → (V1,i, V2,i)→ (Xi, X1,i)→ (Y1,i, Y2,i) (96)
because of the encoding function employed at user 1 which can generate correlation between
Y1,i and
(
Y n1,i+1, Y
n
2,i+1
)
through X1,i+1 that cannot be resolved by conditioning on (Xi, X1,i).
For a similar discussion, the reader can refer to [19].
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We start with the achievable rate of user 1.
nR1 = H(W1) = I(W1; Y
n
1 ) +H(W1|Y
n
1 ) (97)
≤ I(W1; Y
n
1 ) + ǫn (98)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 ) + ǫn (99)
=
n∑
i=1
H(W1|Y
i−1
1 )−H(W1|Y
i−1
1 , Y1,i) + ǫn (100)
=
n∑
i=1
H(W1|Y
i−1
1 , X1,i)−H(W1|Y
i−1
1 , Y1,i) + ǫn (101)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(W1|Y
i−1
1 , X1,i)−H(W1|Y
i−1
1 , Y1,i, X1,i) + ǫn (102)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 , X1,i) + ǫn (103)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y1,i|X1,i)−H(Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 , X1,i,W1) + ǫn (104)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y1,i|X1,i)−H(Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 , X1,i,W1, Y
n
2,i+1) + ǫn (105)
=
n∑
i=1
I(V1,i; Y1,i|X1,i) + ǫn (106)
where (98) is due to Fano’s lemma, (101) follows from the Markov chain W1 → Y
i−1
1 → X1,i,
(102), (104) and (105) are due to the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy, and
(106) follows from the definition of V1,i in (93). Similarly, for the achievable rate of user 2,
we have
nR2 ≤ I(W2; Y
n
2 ) + ǫn (107)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2; Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1) + ǫn (108)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1)−H(Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1,W2) + ǫn (109)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y2,i)−H(Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1,W2, Y
i−1
1 ) + ǫn (110)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(V2,i; Y2,i) + ǫn (111)
where (107) is due to Fano’s lemma, (110) is due to the fact that conditioning cannot increase
entropy, and (111) follows from the definition of V2,i given in (94).
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We now derive the outer bounds on the equivocation rates. We start with user 1.
nRe,1 = H(W1|Y
n
2 ) = H(W1)− I(W1; Y
n
2 ) (112)
= I(W1; Y
n
1 )− I(W1; Y
n
2 ) +H(W1|Y
n
1 ) (113)
≤ I(W1; Y
n
1 )− I(W1; Y
n
2 ) + ǫn (114)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 )− I(W1; Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1) + ǫn (115)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1; Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 )− I(Y
n
2,i+1; Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 ,W1)− I(W1, Y
i−1
1 ; Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1)
+I(Y i−11 ; Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1,W1) + ǫn (116)
where (114) is due to Fano’s lemma. Using [3]
n∑
i=1
I(Y n2,i+1; Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 ,W1) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−11 ; Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1,W1) (117)
in (116), we obtain
nRe,1 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1; Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 )− I(W1, Y
i−1
1 ; Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1) + ǫn (118)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 , Y
n
2,i+1) + I(Y
n
2,i+1; Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 )− I(W1; Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1, , Y
i−1
1 )
−I(Y i−11 ; Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1) + ǫn (119)
Now, using [3]
n∑
i=1
I(Y n2,i+1; Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 ) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−11 ; Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1) (120)
in (119), we obtain
nRe,1 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 , Y
n
2,i+1)− I(W1; Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1
1 ) + ǫn (121)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y1,i|Ui)− I(W1; Y2,i|Ui) + ǫn (122)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Ui; Y1,i|Ui)− I(W1, Ui; Y2,i|Ui) + ǫn (123)
=
n∑
i=1
I(V1,i; Y1,i|Ui)− I(V1,i; Y2,i|Ui) + ǫn (124)
where (122) and (124) follow from the definitions of Ui and V1,i given in (92) and (93),
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respectively. Similarly, we can use the preceding technique for user 2’s equivocation rate as
well after noting that
nRe,2 ≤ H(W2|Y
n
1 , X
n
1 ) ≤ H(W2|Y
n
1 ) (125)
which leads to
nRe,2 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(V2,i; Y2,i|Ui)− I(V2,i; Y1,i|Ui) + ǫn (126)
The other bounds on the equivocation rates can be derived as follows.
nRe,1 = H(W1|Y
n
2 ) ≤ H(W1,W2|Y
n
2 ) (127)
= H(W1|W2, Y
n
2 ) +H(W2|Y
n
2 ) (128)
≤ H(W1|W2, Y
n
2 ) + ǫn (129)
= I(W1; Y
n
1 |W2)− I(W1; Y
n
2 |W2) +H(W1|W2, Y
n
1 ) + ǫn (130)
≤ I(W1; Y
n
1 |W2)− I(W1; Y
n
2 |W2) + ǫ
′
n (131)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y1,i|W2, Y
i−1
1 )− I(W1; Y2,i|W2, Y
n
2,i+1) + ǫ
′
n (132)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1; Y1,i|W2, Y
i−1
1 )− I(W1, Y
i−1
1 ; Y2,i|W2, Y
n
2,i+1) + ǫ
′
n (133)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y1,i|W2, Y
i−1
1 , Y
n
2,i+1)− I(W1; Y2,i|W2, Y
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1
1 ) + ǫ
′
n (134)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y1,i|W2, Ui)− I(W1; Y2,i|W2, Ui) + ǫ
′
n (135)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Ui; Y1,i|W2, Ui)− I(W1, Ui; Y2,i|W2, Ui) + ǫ
′
n (136)
=
n∑
i=1
I(V1,i; Y1,i|V2,i)− I(V1,i; Y2,i|V2,i) + ǫ
′
n (137)
where (129) and (131) are due to Fano’s lemma, and (133) and (134) are due to the following
identities [3]
n∑
i=1
I(Y n2,i+1; Y1,i|W1,W2, Y
i−1
1 ) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−11 ; Y2,i|W1,W2, Y
n
2,i+1) (138)
n∑
i=1
I(Y n2,i+1; Y1,i|W2, Y
i−1
1 ) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−11 ; Y2,i|W2, Y
n
2,i+1) (139)
respectively. Finally, (135) and (137) follow from the definitions of Ui, V1,i and V2,i given
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in (92), (93) and (94), respectively. Similarly, we can use this technique to bound user 2’s
equivocation rate after noting that H(W2|Y n1 , X
n
1 ) ≤ H(W2|Y
n
1 ), which leads to
nRe,2 ≤ H(W2|Y
n
1 , X
n
1 ) ≤ H(W2|Y
n
1 ) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(V2,i; Y2,i|V1,i)− I(V2,i; Y2,i|V1,i) + ǫ
′
n (140)
To express the outer bounds obtained above in a single-letter form, we define U =
JUJ , V1 = V1,J , V2 = V2,J , X = XJ , X1 = X1,J , Y1 = Y1,J , Y2 = Y2,J where J is a random
variable which is uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , n}. Using these new definitions, we can
reach the single-letter expressions given in Theorem 2, hence completing the proof.
B Proof of Theorem 3
The proof is as follows.
Re,2 ≤ H(W2|Y
n
1 , X
n
1 ) ≤ I(W2; Y
n
2 |X
n
1 )− I(W2; Y
n
1 |X
n
1 ) +H(W2|Y
n
2 , X
n
1 ) (141)
≤ I(W2; Y
n
2 |X
n
1 )− I(W2; Y
n
1 |X
n
1 ) + ǫn (142)
≤ I(W2; Y
n
2 |X
n
1 , Y
n
1 ) + ǫn (143)
≤ I(Xn,W2; Y
n
2 |X
n
1 , Y
n
1 ) + ǫn (144)
= I(Xn; Y n2 |X
n
1 , Y
n
1 ) + ǫn (145)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xn; Y2,i|X
n
1 , Y
n
1 , Y
i−1
2 ) + ǫn (146)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y2,i|X1,i, Y1,i)−H(Y2,i|X
n
1 , Y
n
1 , Y
i−1
2 , X
n) + ǫn (147)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Y2,i|X1,i, Y1,i)−H(Y2,i|X1,i, Y1,i, Xi) + ǫn (148)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y2,i|X1,i, Y1,i) + ǫn (149)
where (142) is due to Fano’s lemma, (145) follows from the fact that given Xn, W2 is
independent of all other random variables, (147) is due to the fact that conditioning cannot
increase entropy, and (148) follows from the Markov chains
(Y1,i, Y2,i)→ (Xi, X1,i)→ (Y
i−1
1 , Y
i−1
2 , X
i−1, X i−11 ) (150)
Y2,i → (Xi, X1,i, Y1,i)→ (Y
n
1,i+1, X
n
i+1, X
n
1,i+1) (151)
Thus, after defining an independent random variable J , that is uniformly distributed over
{1, . . . , n}, and X = XJ , X1 = X1,J , Y1 = Y1,J , Y2 = Y2,J , we can obtain the single-letter
expression in Theorem 3, completing the proof.
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C Proof of Corollary 1
In Propositions 1 and 2, if we take a → ∞, then the secrecy rate in (49) can be shown to
be achievable. As a notational remark, H(·) denotes the differential entropy in this section.
We now compute an outer bound for Re,2 using Theorem 3,
Re,2 ≤ I(X ; Y2|X1, Y1) (152)
= H(Y2|X1, Y1)−H(Z2|Z1) (153)
≤ H(X + Z2|Y1)−H(Z2) (154)
≤ H(X + Z2 − αY1)−
1
2
log(2πeN2) (155)
≤
1
2
log(2πe)E
[
(X + Z2 − αY1)
2
]
−
1
2
log(2πeN2) (156)
≤
1
2
log
(
(1− α)2P + α2N1 +N2
)
−
1
2
log(N2) (157)
where in (154), we used the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy and thatH(Z2|Z1)
= H(Z2) due to the independence of Z1 and Z2. Equation (155) is again due to the fact that
conditioning cannot increase entropy, (156) comes from the fact that Gaussian distribution
maximizes entropy subject to a power constraint, and (157) is obtained by using the power
constraint on X . Finally, we note that (157) is a valid outer bound for every α and if we
select α as
α =
P
P +N1
(158)
we get (49), completing the proof.
D Proof of Theorem 4
The transmitter uses the joint encoding scheme of Marton [22] and user 1 uses a CAF
scheme [17]. User 2 employs list decoding to find which Yˆ1 is sent. Let A
n
ǫ (V1) and A
n
ǫ (V2)
denote the sets of strongly typical i.i.d. length-n sequences of v1 and v2, respectively. Let
Anǫ (V1|v2) (resp. A
n
ǫ (V2|v1)) denote the set of length-n sequences V1 (resp. V2) that are
jointly typical with v2 (resp. v1). Furthermore, let S
n
ǫ (v1) (resp. S
n
ǫ (v2)) denote the set
of v1 (resp. v2) sequences for which A
n
ǫ (V2|v1) (resp. A
n
ǫ (V1|v2)) are non-empty. Fix the
probability distribution as
p(v1, v2)p(x|v1, v2)p(u, x1)p(yˆ1|u, v1, y1) (159)
Codebook structure:
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1. Select 2nR(Vi) vi sequences through
p(vi) =


1
||Snǫ (vi)||
, if vi ∈ S
n
ǫ (vi)
0, otherwise
(160)
in an i.i.d. manner and index them as vi(wi, w˜i, li) where wi ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nRi
}
, w˜i ∈
{1, . . . , 2nR˜i} and li ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nLi
}
for i = 1, 2. Ri, R˜i, Li and R(Vi) are related
through
R(Vi) = Ri + R˜i + Li, i = 1, 2 (161)
Furthermore, we set
L1 + L2 = I(V1;V2) + ǫ (162)
to ensure that for given pairs (w1, w˜1) and (w2, w˜2), we can find a jointly typical pair
(v1(w1, w˜1, l1),v2(w2, w˜2, l2)) for some l1, l2.
2. For each (w1, w2), the transmitter randomly picks (w˜1, w˜2) and finds a pair (v1(w1, w˜1, l1),
v2(w2, w˜2, l2)) that is jointly typical. Such a pair exists with high probability due to
(162). Then, given this pair of (v1,v2), the transmitter generates its channel inputs
through
∏n
i=1 p(xi|v1,i, v2,i).
3. User 1 generates 2nR0 length-n sequences u through p(u) =
∏n
i=1 p(ui) and labels them
as u(si) where si ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR0}.
4. For each u(si), user 1 generates 2
nRˆ length-n sequences yˆ1 through p(yˆ1|u) =
∏n
i=1
p(yˆ1,i|ui) and indexes them as yˆ1(zi|si) where zi ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nRˆ}.
5. For each u(si), user 1 generates 2
nR′
0 length-n sequences x1 through p(x1|u) =
∏n
i=1
p(x1,i|ui) and indexes them as x1(ti|si) where ti ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR
′
0}.
Partitioning:
• Partition 2nRˆ into cells Ssi where si ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nR0}.
Encoding:
The transmitter sends x corresponding to the pair (w1, w2). User 1 (relay) sends x1(ti|si)
if the estimate of y1(i−1), i.e., zˆi−1, falls into Ssi and ti is chosen randomly from {1, . . . , 2
nR′
0}.
The use of many x1(ti|si) for actual help signal u(si) aims to confuse user 2 and to decrease
its decoding capability.
Decoding:
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a. Decoding at user 1:
1. User 1 seeks a unique typical pair of (y1(i),v1(w1,i, w˜1,i, li),x1(ti|si)) which can be
achieved with vanishingly small error probability if
R(V1) ≤ I(V1; Y1|X1) (163)
2. User 1 decides that zi is received if there exists a jointly typical pair (yˆ1(zi|si),y1(i),
v1(w1,i, w˜1,i, li),x1(ti|si)) which can be guaranteed to occur if
Rˆ ≥ I(Yˆ1; Y1|U,X1, V1) (164)
b. Decoding at user 2:
1. User 2 seeks a unique jointly typical pair of (y2(i),u(si)) which can be found with
vanishingly small error probability if
R0 ≤ I(U ; Y2) (165)
2. User 2 employs list decoding to decode yˆ1(zi−1|si−1). It first calculates its ambiguity
set as
L (yˆ1(zi−1|sˆi−1)) = {yˆ1(zi−1|sˆi−1) : (yˆ1(zi−1|sˆi−1),y2(i− 1)) is jointly typical} (166)
and takes its intersection with Ssˆi which results in a unique and correct intersection
point if
Rˆ ≤ I(Yˆ1; Y2|U) +R0 ≤ I(Yˆ1, U ; Y2) (167)
Equations (164) and (167) lead to the compression constraint in (58).
3. User 2 decides that v2(w2,i−1, w˜2,i−1, l2,i−1) is received if there exists a unique jointly
typical pair (v2(w2,i−1, w˜2,i−1, l2,i−1),y2(i− 1), yˆ1(zˆi−1|sˆi−1)), which can be found with
vanishingly small error probability if
R(V2) ≤ I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|U) (168)
Equivocation computation:
We now show that Re,1 and Re,2 satisfying (53)-(54) and (55)-(56) are achievable with
the coding scheme presented. To this end, we treat several possible cases separately. First,
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assume that
R1 ≥ I(V1; Y1|X1)− I(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|V2, U)− I(V1;V2) (169)
R2 ≥ I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|U)− I(V2; Y1|V1, X1)− I(V1;V2) (170)
For this case, we select the total number of codewords, i.e., R(Vi), i = 1, 2, as
R(V1) = I(V1; Y1|X1) (171)
R(V2) = I(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|U) (172)
With this selection, we have
R˜1 + L1 ≤ I(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|V2, U) + I(V1;V2) (173)
R˜2 + L2 ≤ I(V2; Y1|V1, X1) + I(V1;V2) (174)
We start with user 1’s equivocation rate,
H(W1|Y
n
2 ) ≥ H(W1|Y
n
2 , V
n
2 , U
n, Yˆ n1 ) (175)
= H(W1, Y
n
2 , V
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 |U
n)−H(Y n2 , V
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 |U
n) (176)
= H(V n1 ,W1, Y
n
2 , V
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 |U
n)−H(V n1 |W1, Y
n
2 , V
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , U
n)
−H(Y n2 , V
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 |U
n) (177)
= H(V n1 |U
n) +H(W1, Y
n
2 , V
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 |U
n, V n1 )−H(V
n
1 |W1, Y
n
2 , V
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , U
n)
−H(Y n2 , V
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 |U
n) (178)
≥ H(V n1 |U
n)− I(V n1 ; Y
n
2 , V
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 |U
n)−H(V n1 |W1, Y
n
2 , V
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , U
n) (179)
where each term will be treated separately. First term is
H(V n1 |U
n) = H(V n1 ) = nR(V1) = nI(V1; Y1|X1) (180)
where the first equality is due to the independence of Un and V n1 . The second equality
follows from the fact that V n1 can take 2
nR(V1) values with equal probability. The third
equality comes from our selection in (171). The second term of (179) can be bounded as
I(V n1 ; Y
n
2 , V
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 |U
n) ≤ nI(V1; Y2, V2, Yˆ1|U) + nǫn (181)
using the approach devised in Lemma 3 of [10]. To bound the last term in (179), we assume
that user 2 is trying to decode V n1 given the side information W1 = w1. Since V
n
1 can take
less than 2n(I(V1;Y2,Yˆ1|U,V2)+I(V1;V2)) values (see (173)) given W1 = w1, user 2 can decode V
n
1
with vanishingly small error probability as long as W1 = w1 is given. Consequently, the use
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of Fano’s lemma yields
H(V n1 |W1, Y
n
2 , V
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , U
n) ≤ ǫn (182)
Plugging (180), (181) and (182) into (179), we get
H(W1|Y
n
2 ) ≥ nI(V1; Y1|X1)− nI(V1; Y2, Yˆ1, V2|U)− nǫn (183)
= nI(V1; Y1|X1)− nI(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|V2, U)− nI(V1;V2)− nǫn (184)
where (184) follows from the independence of (V1, V2) and U , i.e., I(V1;V2|U) = I(V1;V2).
Similarly, we can bound equivocation of user 2 as follows,
H(W2|Y
n
1 , X
n
1 ) ≥ H(W2|Y
n
1 , X
n
1 , V
n
1 ) (185)
= H(W2, Y
n
1 , V
n
1 |X
n
1 )−H(Y
n
1 , V
n
1 |X
n
1 ) (186)
= H(W2, V
n
2 , Y
n
1 , V
n
1 |X
n
1 )−H(V
n
2 |W2, Y
n
1 , V
n
1 , X
n
1 )−H(Y
n
1 , V
n
1 |X
n
1 ) (187)
= H(V n2 |X
n
1 ) +H(W2, Y
n
1 , V
n
1 |X
n
1 , V
n
2 )−H(V
n
2 |W2, Y
n
1 , V
n
1 , X
n
1 )
−H(Y n1 , V
n
1 |X
n
1 ) (188)
≥ H(V n2 |X
n
1 )− I(V
n
2 ; Y
n
1 , V
n
1 |X
n
1 )−H(V
n
2 |W2, Y
n
1 , V
n
1 , X
n
1 ) (189)
where the first term is
H(V n2 |X
n
1 ) = H(V
n
2 ) = nR(V2) = nI(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|U) (190)
where the first equality is due to the independence of V n2 and X
n
1 , the second equality comes
from the fact that V n2 can take 2
nR(V2) values with equal probability and the last equality is
a consequence of our choice in (172). The second term of (189) can be bounded as
I(V n2 ; Y
n
1 , V
n
1 |X
n
1 ) ≤ nI(V2; Y1, V1|X1) + nǫn (191)
following the approach of Lemma 3 of [10]. To bound the last term of (189), we assume that
user 1 is trying to decode V n2 given the side information W2 = w2. Since V
n
2 can take at
most 2n(I(V2;Y1|V1,X1)+I(V2;V1)) values (see (174)) given W2 = w2, user 1 can decode V
n
2 with
vanishingly small error probability as long as this side information is available. Consequently,
the use of Fano’s lemma yields
H(V n2 |W2, Y
n
1 , V
n
1 , X
n
1 ) ≤ ǫn (192)
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Plugging (190), (191) and (192) into (189), we get
H(W2|Y
n
1 , X
n
1 ) ≥ nI(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|U)− nI(V2; Y1, V1|X1)− nǫn (193)
= nI(V2; Y2, Yˆ1|U)− nI(V2; Y1|V1, X1)− nI(V1;V2)− nǫn (194)
where (194) follows from the independence of (V1, V2) and X1, i.e., I(V1;V2|X1) = I(V1;V2).
We have completed the equivocation calculation for the case described by (169)-(170).
The proofs of other cases involve no different arguments besides decreasing the total number
codewords in (171)-(172). For example, if
R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|X1)− I(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|V2, U)− I(V1;V2) (195)
then we select the total number of codewords for user 1 as
R(V1) = R1 + I(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|V2, U) + I(V1;V2) (196)
which is equivalent to saying that
R˜1 + L1 = I(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|V2, U) + I(V1;V2) (197)
In this case, following the steps from (175) to (179), we can bound the equivocation of user
1 as follows,
H(W1|Y
n
2 ) ≥ H(V
n
1 |U
n)− I(V n1 ; Y
n
2 , V
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 |U
n)−H(V n1 |W1, Y
n
2 , V
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , U
n) (198)
where the first term is now
H(V n1 |U
n) = H(V n1 ) = nR(V1) = n(R1 + I(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|V2, U) + I(V1;V2)) (199)
where the first equality is due to the independence of V n1 and U
n, the second equality is
due to the fact that V n1 can take at most 2
nR(V1) values with equal probability and the last
equality is a consequence of our choice in (196). An upper bound on the second term was
already obtained in (181). The third term can also be shown to decay to zero as n goes to
infinity considering the case that user 2 is decoding V n1 using side information W1 = w1.
Since V n1 can take 2
n(I(V1;Y2,Yˆ1|V2,U)+I(V1;V2)) values given W1 = w1, user 2 can decode V
n
2 with
vanishingly small error probability as long as this side information is available. Therefore,
the use of Fano’s lemma implies
H(V n1 |W1, Y
n
2 , V
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , U
n) ≤ ǫn (200)
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Plugging (181),(199), (200) into (198), we get
H(W1|Y
n
2 ) ≥ n(R1 + I(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|V2, U) + I(V1;V2))− I(V1; Y2, V2, Yˆ1|U)− nǫn (201)
= nR1 − nǫn (202)
where we used the fact that U and (V1, V2) are independent, i.e., I(V1;V2|U) = I(V1;V2). The
other cases leading to different equivocation rates can be proved similarly, hence omitted.
E Proof of Theorem 5
Fix the probability distribution as
p(v1, v2)p(x|v1, v2)p(u1, x1)p(yˆ1|u1, y1)p(u2, x2)p(yˆ2|u2, y2) (203)
Codebook structure:
1. Select 2nR(Vi) vi sequences through
p(vi) =


1
||Snǫ (vi)||
, if vi ∈ Snǫ (vi)
0, otherwise
(204)
in an i.i.d. manner and index them as vi(wi, w˜i, li) where wi ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nRi
}
, w˜i ∈
{1, . . . , 2nR˜i} and li ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nLi
}
for i = 1, 2. Ri, R˜i, Li and R(Vi) are related
through
R(Vi) = Ri + R˜i + Li, i = 1, 2 (205)
Furthermore, we set
L1 + L2 = I(V1;V2) + ǫ (206)
to ensure that for given pairs (w1, w˜1) and (w2, w˜2), we can find a jointly typical pair
(v1(w1, w˜1, l1),v2(w2, w˜2, l2)) for some l1, l2.
2. For each (w1, w2), the transmitter randomly picks (w˜1, w˜2) and finds a pair (v1(w1, w˜1, l1),
v2(w2, w˜2, l2)) that is jointly typical. Such a pair exists with high probability due to
(206). Then, given this pair of (v1,v2), the transmitter generates its channel inputs
through
∏n
i=1 p(xi|v1,i, v2,i).
3. User j generates 2nR0,j length-n sequences uj through p(uj) =
∏n
i=1 p(uj,i) and labels
them as uj(sj,i) where sj,i ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR0,j} where j = 1, 2.
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4. For each uj(sj,i), user j generates 2
nRˆj length-n sequences yˆj through p(yˆj |uj) =∏n
i=1 p(yˆj,i|uj,i) and indexes them as yˆj(zj,i|sj,i) where zj,i ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nRˆj}, j = 1, 2.
5. For each uj(sj,i), user j generates 2
nR′
0,j length-n sequences xj through p(xj|uj) =∏n
i=1 p(xj,i|uj,i) and indexes them as xj(tj,i|sj,i) where tj,i ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nR′
0,j}, j = 1, 2.
Partitioning:
• Partition 2nRˆj into cells Ssj,i where sj,i ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nR0,j}, j = 1, 2.
Encoding:
The transmitter sends x corresponding to the pair (w1, w2). User j sends xj(tj,i|sj,i) if the
estimate of yj(i−1), i.e., zˆj,i−1, falls into Ssj,i and tj,i is chosen randomly from {1, . . . , 2
nR′
0,j}.
The use of many xj(tj,i|sj,i) for actual help signal uj(sj,i) aims to confuse the other user and
to decrease its decoding capability.
Decoding:
We only consider decoding at user 1. Final expressions regarding user 2 will follow due
to symmetry.
1. User 1 seeks a unique jointly typical pair of (y1(i),u2(s2,i)) which can be found with
vanishingly small error probability if
R0,2 ≤ I(U2; Y1|X1) (207)
2. User 1 decides on yˆ1(z1,i|s1,i) by looking for a jointly typical pair (yˆ1(z1,i|s1,i),y1(i),
u2(s2,i),x1(t1,i|s1,i)) which can be ensured to exist if
Rˆ1 ≥ I(Yˆ1; Y1|U1, U2, X1) (208)
3. User 1 employs list decoding to decode yˆ2(z2,i−1|s2,i−1). It first calculates its ambiguity
set as
L (yˆ2(z2,i−1|sˆ2,i−1)) = {yˆ2(z2,i−1|sˆ2,i−1) : (yˆ2(z2,i−1|sˆ2,i−1),y1(i− 1)) is jointly typical}
(209)
and then takes its intersection with Ssˆ2,i which results in a unique and correct inter-
section point if
Rˆ2 ≤ I(Yˆ2; Y1|U2, X1) +R0,2 ≤ I(Yˆ2, U2; Y1|X1) (210)
4. User 1 decides that v1(w1,i−1, w˜1,i−1, l1,i−1) is received if there exists a unique jointly typ-
ical pair (v1(w1,i−1, w˜1,i−1, l1,i−1),y1(i− 1), yˆ2(zˆ2,i−1|sˆ2,i−1)) which can be found with
vanishingly small error probability if
R(V1) ≤ I(V1; Y1, Yˆ2|X1, U2) (211)
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Equivocation computation:
Similar to the previous proofs, we treat each case separately. Due to symmetry, we only
consider user 1. If the rate of user 1 is such that
R1 ≥ I(V1; Y1, Yˆ2|X1, U2)− I(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|X2, V2, U1)− I(V1;V2) (212)
then we select the total number of codewords as
R(V1) = I(V1; Y1, Yˆ2|X1, U2) (213)
which implies that
R˜1 + L1 ≤ I(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|X2, V2, U1) + I(V1;V2) (214)
The equivocation rate can be bounded as follows,
H(W1|Y
n
2 , X
n
2 ) ≥ H(W1|Y
n
2 , X
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , V
n
2 , U
n
1 ) (215)
= H(W1, Y
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , V
n
2 |X
n
2 , U
n
1 )−H(Y
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , V
n
2 |X
n
2 , U
n
1 ) (216)
= H(W1, V
n
1 , Y
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , V
n
2 |X
n
2 , U
n
1 )−H(V
n
1 |W1, Y
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , V
n
2 , X
n
2 , U
n
1 )
−H(Y n2 , Yˆ
n
1 , V
n
2 |X
n
2 , U
n
1 ) (217)
= H(V n1 |X
n
2 , U
n
1 ) +H(W1, Y
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , V
n
2 |X
n
2 , U
n
1 , V
n
1 )
−H(V n1 |W1, Y
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , V
n
2 , X
n
2 , U
n
1 )−H(Y
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , V
n
2 |X
n
2 , U
n
1 ) (218)
≥ H(V n1 |X
n
2 , U
n
1 )− I(V
n
1 ; Y
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , V
n
2 |X
n
2 , U
n
1 )
−H(V n1 |W1, Y
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , V
n
2 , X
n
2 , U
n
1 ) (219)
We treat each term in (219) separately. The first term is
H(V n1 |X
n
2 , U
n
1 ) = H(V
n
1 ) = nR(V1) = nI(V1; Y1, Yˆ2|X1, U2) (220)
where the first equality is due to the independence of V n1 and (X
n
2 , U
n
1 ), the second equality
follows from the fact that V n1 can take 2
nR(V1) values with equal probability and the last
equality is due to our choice in (213). The second term of (219) can be bounded as
I(V n1 ; Y
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , V
n
2 |X
n
2 , U
n
1 ) ≤ nI(V1; Y2, Yˆ1, V2|X2, U1) + nǫn (221)
following Lemma 3 of [10]. To bound the last term of (219), we consider the case that
user 2 is trying to decode V n1 given the side information W1 = w1. Since V
n
1 can take
2n(I(V1;Y2,Yˆ1|X2,V2,U1)+I(V1;V2)) values at most, user 2 can decode V n1 with vanishingly small
error probability as long as this side information is available. Hence, the use of Fano’s
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lemma yields
H(V n1 |W1, Y
n
2 , Yˆ
n
1 , V
n
2 , X
n
2 , U
n
1 ) ≤ ǫn (222)
Plugging (220), (221), (222) into (219), we get
H(W1|Y
n
2 , X
n
2 ) ≥ nI(V1; Y1, Yˆ2|X1, U2)− nI(V1; Y2, Yˆ1, V2|X2, U1)− nǫn (223)
= nI(V1; Y1, Yˆ2|X1, U2)− nI(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|X2, V2, U1)− nI(V1;V2)− nǫn (224)
where (224) follows from the independence of (X2, U1) and (V1, V2), i.e., I(V1;V2|X2, U1)
= I(V1;V2).
For the other case, i.e., if the rate of user 1 is such that
R1 ≤ I(V1; Y1, Yˆ2|X1, U2)− I(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|X2, V2, U1)− I(V1;V2) (225)
we select the total number of codewords as
R(V1) = R1 + I(V1; Y2, Yˆ1|X2, V2, U1) + I(V1;V2) (226)
and following the same lines of computation, we can show that
H(W1|Y
n
2 , X
n
2 ) ≥ nR1 − nǫn (227)
completing the proof.
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